diagnosis of AUD may also be differential as a function of educational level or income. Individuals with substantial financial resources may, for example, be able to engage in other forms of therapy which are less stigmatizing than an AUD admission diagnosis or may even be able to travel out of country to seek treatment. Given that, perhaps, wealthier or more educated individuals may be higher in intelligence, this may explain part of the association between intelligence and AUD in the non-comorbid subset of the data. It may also be that those more advantaged in society may also be able to avoid a psychiatric diagnosis. This simply points to a further limitation of the study; i.e., that absent a formal evaluation of individuals one has no clear idea of what interpretional challenges the registry information of diagnosis actually provides. Second, I read through the results sections a few times but find no formal description of the interaction of presence/absence of comorbid psychiatric disorders with intelligence other than the statement: "Due to significant interaction between intelligence and other psychiatric disorders (p<0.001)." Could the authors explicitly state what the model was for this test? To some extent I found myself wondering if the differential effect documented by the authors is alternatively due to the fact that lack of intelligence could cause other psychiatric disorders which, taken together, are part of a general increased gradient of risk for AUD. Third and perhaps most importantly, throughout the manuscript logistic regression models are used with no investigation of whether the assumptions of the logistic model are met. It is quite possible that a small number of influential observations could be driving the differential effect which the authors report. These should be part of any analysis using logistic regression. Kutner, Nachtsheim, Neter & Li (2005, pp. 591-601) provide a relatively standard introduction to diagnostics for logistic regression. I suspect that lowess regressions ad the half-normal probability plot and simulated envelope will yield a substantially different pattern of findings from that proposed by the authors. Particularly for the relatively small sample size conditions for some of the analyses, I suspect that the magnitude of effect is largely due to the presence of influential observations. Although mentioned by the authors in the limitations section, given that some forms of AUD are developmentally limited, prevalence rates of AUD by age of participant at diagnosis should be reported and analyses which investigate whether differential relationships between AUD and intelligence apply as a function of age of onset should be explored. Is it simply not possible to explore this question with the data? I would assume that the registry data at least contain age of admission. Separate analyses should be done in which age of onset is stratified to explore whether some additional interactions involving AUD occur. AUD may also vary as a function of the individual's educational level or employment or even marital status. Are there any registry sources of such information? Heavy alcohol use, for example, typifies some of the collegiate experience at least in the US. Conversely, there is also some literature to suggest increased risk for individuals who do not attend higher education in US samples or for those entering the military. Additionally is it the case that some individuals were repeatedly admitted or admitted with the larger number of psychiatric disorders? There is substantial literature to suggest that AUD's effects are particularly pronounced for women (as found in work by Sara Jo
1.
First, one of the important limitations of the study is that the authors do not address the possibility that third variable explanations exist for their possible differential finding of intelligence being related to AUD only in men with no other psychiatric disorders. For example, is it the case that all individuals in the Danish Health care system are equally likely to be referred to psychiatric admission, or, for example, could it be that some types of individuals may be less likely to be admitted for psychiatric evaluation? In the US, for example, it seems plausible that individuals with low education, from rural backgrounds, or from low income groups are less likely to avail themselves of psychiatric services. In the Danish system, however, I would think it reasonable that all individuals who wished to use the service could. However, might some types of individuals from some types of backgrounds be less likely to use the service? On page 9 we read that confounders measured at one year after birth. It is probably the case that these parental variables probably changed a lot as the child grew up, making the variable somewhat less informative than it might otherwise appear. Additionally, the diagnosis of AUD may also be differential as a function of educational level or income. Individuals with substantial financial resources may, for example, be able to engage in other forms of therapy which are less stigmatizing than an AUD admission diagnosis or may even be able to travel out of country to seek treatment. Given that, perhaps, wealthier or more educated individuals may be higher in intelligence, this may explain part of the association between intelligence and AUD in the non-comorbid subset of the data. It may also be that those more advantaged in society may also be able to avoid a psychiatric diagnosis. This simply points to a further limitation of the study; i.e., that absent a formal evaluation of individuals one has no clear idea of what interpretional challenges the registry information of diagnosis actually provides. Author: We cannot exclude the possibility that some types of individuals will be less likely to be admitted for psychiatric admission (e.g. those with low socioeconomic position), but we see no strong reason to believe that this would have a substantial impact on the result because all Danish residents have equal access to hospitals, and all treatment is free of charge.
Regarding the confounders, most of them were measured at birth, but due to their nature they could not change during childhood (e.g. birth weight, smoking during pregnancy). Nevertheless, it is correct that childhood socioeconomic position (SEP) was measured at one year after birth. Assessment of SEP at this age has the advantage that it is unlikely to be influenced by characteristics of the child, but it also has the limitation that it may not be representative of family social status throughout childhood. This is now commented on in the discussion: "Also, adjustment for childhood SEP using a measure from one year after birth may result in residual confounding as this measure does not address changes in childhood SEP beyond the first year." (Page 18) Our measure of childhood SEP is a relatively broad measure and perhaps for this reason it has shown to be a very strong predictor of adult offspring characteristics, including mental traits such as intelligence and mental disorders (1,2).
We agree that alternative explanations for the protective effect of intelligence against AUD exist, and we have now elaborated on our interpretation of findings in the discussion: "Alternatively, more educated and intelligent individuals may be more likely to hide their alcohol use problems from health professionals and less likely to ask for help, and therefore not receive an AUD diagnosis. It could also be that health professionals may tend to overlook AUD among more educated individuals, and attribute the symptoms to less stigmatizing conditions." (Page 15)
2.
Second, I read through the results sections a few times but find no formal description of the interaction of presence/absence of comorbid psychiatric disorders with intelligence other than the statement: "Due to significant interaction between intelligence and other psychiatric disorders (p<0.001)." Could the authors explicitly state what the model was for this test? To some extent I found myself wondering if the differential effect documented by the authors is alternatively due to the fact that lack of intelligence could cause other psychiatric disorders which, taken together, are part of a general increased gradient of risk for AUD. Author: The text now states: "Due to significant interaction between intelligence and other psychiatric disorders (p<0.001) with respect to risk of AUD in the multiple adjusted model, the full sample was stratified by psychiatric disorders ( Table 2 )." (Page 13)
The weak association between intelligence and AUD among individuals with other psychiatric disorders could be due to the fact that low intelligence is associated with other psychiatric disorders, which per se are closely linked with AUD. However, this does not explain the association between low intelligence and AUD among those not registered with other psychiatric disorders.
3.
Third and perhaps most importantly, throughout the manuscript logistic regression models are used with no investigation of whether the assumptions of the logistic model are met. It is quite possible that a small number of influential observations could be driving the differential effect which the authors report. These should be part of any analysis using logistic regression. Kutner, Nachtsheim, Neter & Li (2005, pp. 591-601) provide a relatively standard introduction to diagnostics for logistic regression. I suspect that lowess regressions ad the half-normal probability plot and simulated envelope will yield a substantially different pattern of findings from that proposed by the authors. Particularly for the relatively small sample size conditions for some of the analyses, I suspect that the magnitude of effect is largely due to the presence of influential observations. Author: It is not clear why the reviewer suspects that the results are due to influential observationsin particular since IQ scores are usually relatively symmetric and approximate a normal distribution. However, to accommodate the reviewer's comment, we have now evaluated the assumptions of the logistic model by examining influential observations.
We categorized the intelligence test score in tertiles (<94, 94-108, ≥109 points) and examined the association between intelligence categories and AUD in the two subgroups of men with and without psychiatric disorders. In this analysis, outliers among those with low and high intelligence scores will not have a particular large effect on the estimates. The results are shown in the Figure below.
Among those without other psychiatric disorders, the odds of AUD for the two lowest intelligence tertiles compared to the highest were: ORlow=9.09 (95% CI: 5.03; 16.43) and ORmiddle=3.49 (1.86; 6.54). Among those with other psychiatric disorders, the odds of AUD for the two lowest intelligence tertiles compared to the highest were: ORlow=1.77 (1.14; 2.75) and ORmiddle=1.03 (0.64; 1.68). The results using intelligence in tertiles were similar to the logistic regression model which assumes a linear effect of intelligence on AUD. Hence, low intelligence had the largest influence on risk of AUD among those without other psychiatric disorders. This suggests that the model is not highly influenced by outliers.
The use of Cook's distance in logistic regression may be problematic, but we also estimated cook's distance residuals in a logistic model with the interaction between intelligence and other psychiatric disorders with respect to risk of AUD. Observations with extreme cook's distance values were excluded from the analyses (cut-off 0.5, 4% of the study population are excluded, N=3,174). The results without influential observations were similar to the logistic regression model which assumes a linear effect of intelligence on AUD. Hence, the interaction between intelligence and psychiatric disorder with respect to risk of AUD (p<0.001) remained significant, and low intelligence had the largest influence on risk of AUD among those without other psychiatric disorders.
4.
Although mentioned by the authors in the limitations section, given that some forms of AUD are developmentally limited, prevalence rates of AUD by age of participant at diagnosis should be reported and analyses which investigate whether differential relationships between AUD and intelligence apply as a function of age of onset should be explored. Is it simply not possible to explore this question with the data? I would assume that the registry data at least contain age of admission. Separate analyses should be done in which age of onset is stratified to explore whether some additional interactions involving AUD occur. AUD may also vary as a function of the individual's educational level or employment or even marital status. Are there any registry sources of such information? Heavy alcohol use, for example, typifies some of the collegiate experience at least in the US. Conversely, there is also some literature to suggest increased risk for individuals who do not attend higher education in US samples or for those entering the military. Author: We agree with the reviewer that age-of-onset of AUD should be investigated further. The manuscript is now updated with the following information:
"The median age of first AUD registration was 36.0 years. Among men with AUD, 34 % were registered between ages 18-30, 32 % between ages 30-40 and 33 % between ages 40-54." (Page 12) "It could be expected that the association between intelligence and AUD would differ by age-of-onset of AUD (e.g. early versus late registration of AUD). In sensitivity analyses, we analyzed the association between intelligence and AUD among those registered before and after the median AUD age (< 36 vs. ≥ 36 years)." (Page 11) "To determine whether the association between intelligence and AUD differed according to age-ofonset, we divided cases of AUD into those registered before and after age 36. The OR associated with one SD decrease in intelligence score was 2.57 (95% CI: 2.18; 3.01) in men registered with AUD before age 36, whereas the corresponding OR was 1.47 (95% CI: 1.27; 1.71) in men registered with AUD after age 36. Thus, low intelligence was associated with higher odds of AUD in both age groups, although stronger associations may exist among those registered with AUD early in life." (Page 13)
We do not have any information about the individuals' employment status or marital status in adult life, but we do have self-reported information on school education from the draft board examination. School education was measured in years (6-13 years) and was categorized into two groups: low (≤ 9 years) and high (> 9 years) with 9 years of education corresponding to mandatory education among individuals born in Denmark after 1959. We examined the association between intelligence and AUD stratified by school education. The OR associated with one SD decrease in intelligence score was 1.45 (95% CI: 1.20; 1.75) in men with low school education, whereas the corresponding OR was 1.77 (95% CI: 1.48; 2.13) in men with high school education. Similar associations with AUD were observed for those with low and high school education indicating the school education is not an effect modifier.
5.
Additionally is it the case that some individuals were repeatedly admitted or admitted with the larger number of psychiatric disorders? Author: Some individuals are likely to have been admitted repeatedly with psychiatric disorders or with several different psychiatric disorders across the lifespan. Such measures would to some extent capture the severity of psychiatric disorders experienced by the individuals. However, we believe that it is beyond the scope of this article to test if associations between intelligence and AUD differ according to the severity of other psychiatric disorders.
6.
There is substantial literature to suggest that AUD's effects are particularly pronounced for women (as found in work by Sara Jo Nixon and colleagues, for example). Would it be possible to conduct supplemental analyses by father's and mother's AUD diagnosis? Author: We agree with the reviewer that it could be important to examine AUD in mothers and fathers separately. However, a Danish population-based study based on the same cohort (Copenhagen Perinatal Cohort) showed that both maternal and paternal AUD were associated with increased risk of offspring AUD (3) indicating that the association is not particularly pronounced for either of the parents. Furthermore, effect modification of the association between intelligence and AUD by paternal AUD and maternal AUD was evaluated by introducing interaction terms into the logistic model. The results showed no significant interaction between intelligence and paternal AUD (p=0.16) or between intelligence and maternal AUD (p=0.89).
7.
P. 7. Rather than make the reader calculate the percentages, I would list the percentages in the text. Author: This is now corrected.
8.
p. 12: table 1.should be Table 1 . Author: Yes, this is correct.
9.
p. 15: effect-modificator -is effect-modifier meant? Author: Yes, this is now corrected. Author: We thank the reviewer for all the above comments which we believe have served to improve the article.
Reviewer #2: This is a well-written report of a study using large prospectively monitored dataset. The methods and analyses are appropriate, and the findings are interesting. I recommend publication.
VERSION 2 -REVIEW

REVIEWER
Phillip K Wood University of Missouri, USA REVIEW RETURNED 29-May-2019
GENERAL COMMENTS
Review of bmjopen-2019-028997.R1: Intelligence in young adulthood and alcohol use disorders in a prospective cohort study of Danish men: The role of psychiatric disorders and parental psychiatric history I appreciate the authors' responsive changes to the manuscript in many places. Substantially, I have only a few additional points. While I appreciate the extra effort detailed in the response letter concerning possible influential observations, I do not think the authors' use of polynomial terms detailed on page 10 is an adequate test of the assumption of linearity. I would think that a loess regression would be a relatively straightforward way to assess the functional form of any linear associations presented in the paper. This would apply to any continuous linear predictors. I appreciate the tertiles presented in the response letter, but having only three levels probably obscures any large departures from the assumed linearity in the model. Both R and SAS have loess regression options which are fairly straightforward to use. Second, one of the major conclusions of the study appears to be that the intelligence AUD association is present for individuals without psychiatric disorders but not for those with psychiatric disorders. For example:
The finding that intelligence does not influence the risk of AUD substantially among those registered with psychiatric disorders is intriguing. It is possible that we do not have enough statistical power to estimate an association among those with psychiatric disorders, but this seems unlikely as AUD was more common in men with other psychiatric disorders than in men without. Conversely, men with psychiatric disorders may comprise a high-risk group for AUD as they have co-morbid diagnoses such as mood disorders and personality disorders, which are strongly associated with AUD.
And again later:
The authors write: Separate analyses suggested that psychiatric disorders moderate the effect of intelligence upon risk of AUD. Hence, intelligence was associated with a 2-fold higher risk of AUD in men without other psychiatric disorders, whereas a weaker association was found in men with other psychiatric disorders. I find this conclusion somewhat problematic, but think that some small additional analyses could explore these some alternatives. Specifically, the odds ratios reported in the two models represent risk after accounting for the other predictors in the model. It could be, for example, that the intelligence variable is more correlated with the other terms in the model while this association is much weaker in the nonpsychiatric disorder group. Are the bivariate odds ratios for the two groups very different, I wonder?
In the present manuscript we don't have information as how the average and range of scores in intelligence in these two groups. Alternatively, could it be that the difference in odds ratios is simply due to the fact that the psychiatric group has systematically lower intelligence scores or a more restricted range of scores? Finally, in terms of the general interpretation of the study, some mention of assortative mating, as it relates to intelligence and psychiatric disorders is worthwhile, as these factors pose some limitations for the interpretation for the findings.
I have a few reactions to the response letter. My responses to the authors' letter are in bold.
2.
Second, I read through the results sections a few times but find no formal description of the interaction of presence/absence of comorbid psychiatric disorders with intelligence other than the statement: "Due to significant interaction between intelligence and other psychiatric disorders (p<0.001)." Could the authors explicitly state what the model was for this test? To some extent I found myself wondering if the differential effect documented by the authors is alternatively due to the fact that lack of intelligence could cause other psychiatric disorders which, taken together, are part of a general increased gradient of risk for AUD. Author: The text now states: "Due to significant interaction between intelligence and other psychiatric disorders (p<0.001) with respect to risk of AUD in the multiple adjusted model, the full sample was stratified by psychiatric disorders (Table 2) ." (Page 13)
The weak association between intelligence and AUD among individuals with other psychiatric disorders could be due to the fact that low intelligence is associated with other psychiatric disorders, which per se are closely linked with AUD. However, this does not explain the association between low intelligence and AUD among those not registered with other psychiatric disorders. The point here is that collinearity between predictors could be an explanation for the absence of effects or their presence. I would think that the only way to explore this would be to run the models both as restricted subsets which explore the presence of interactions and those which are based on a full model including all variables and terms. Regarding the confounders, most of them were measured at birth, but due to their nature they could not change during childhood (e.g. birth weight, smoking during pregnancy). Nevertheless, it is correct that childhood socioeconomic position (SEP) was measured at one year after birth. Assessment of SEP at this age has the advantage that it is unlikely to be influenced by characteristics of the child, but it also has the limitation that it may not be representative of family social status throughout childhood. This is now commented on in the discussion: I only note that the confounds present in the data are not necessarily limited to the measures gathered at birth. Some description of types of confounders which were not assessed is appropriate, such as the differential access to education or the social environments which individuals encountered subsequent to the initial assessment. Some small points: Do draft board records include individuals who are conscientious objectors? If not, how does this bias the results? p. 18 It is worth mentioning that AUD's vary as a function of lifespan and so the lifespan developmental aspect of the diagnosis bears mentioning, particularly as it relates to intelligence, which also varies across the lifespan. While I appreciate the extra effort detailed in the response letter concerning possible influential observations, I do not think the authors' use of polynomial terms detailed on page 10 is an adequate test of the assumption of linearity. I would think that a loess regression would be a relatively straightforward way to assess the functional form of any linear associations presented in the paper. This would apply to any continuous linear predictors. I appreciate the tertiles presented in the response letter, but having only three levels probably obscures any large departures from the assumed linearity in the model. Both R and SAS have loess regression options which are fairly straightforward to use.
Author, revision 2:
To accommodate the reviewer's comment, we have now evaluated the assumption of linearity by use of the loess regression option in SAS. This option saves a smoothed variable by running a locally weighted regression of Y (here: AUD) on X (here: IQ). As shown in the plot below, the assumption of a linear effect of IQ appears to be reasonable, which is now described in the Methods section: "The assumption of linearity was evaluated by fitting loess regression models, but no violations were observed." Second, one of the major conclusions of the study appears to be that the intelligence AUD association is present for individuals without psychiatric disorders but not for those with psychiatric disorders. For example: "The finding that intelligence does not influence the risk of AUD substantially among those registered with psychiatric disorders is intriguing. It is possible that we do not have enough statistical power to estimate an association among those with psychiatric disorders, but this seems unlikely as AUD was more common in men with other psychiatric disorders than in men without. Conversely, men with psychiatric disorders may comprise a high-risk group for AUD as they have co-morbid diagnoses such as mood disorders and personality disorders, which are strongly associated with AUD." And again later:
The authors write: "Separate analyses suggested that psychiatric disorders moderate the effect of intelligence upon risk of AUD. Hence, intelligence was associated with a 2-fold higher risk of AUD in men without other psychiatric disorders, whereas a weaker association was found in men with other psychiatric disorders." I find this conclusion somewhat problematic, but think that some small additional analyses could explore these some alternatives. Specifically, the odds ratios reported in the two models represent risk after accounting for the other predictors in the model. It could be, for example, that the intelligence variable is more correlated with the other terms in the model while this association is much weaker in the nonpsychiatric disorder group. Are the bivariate odds ratios for the two groups very different, I wonder?
Author, revision 2:
The bivariate associations between intelligence and AUD in the two groups differed significantly as reflected by the significant interaction (p < 0.001) in the unadjusted analyses. As shown in Table 2 in the original manuscript (Model 1), the OR for AUD per one SD decrease in intelligence in men with psychiatric disorders is 1.26 (1.06; 1.48), whereas the corresponding OR in men without psychiatric disorders is 2.27 (1.90; 2.71). Thus, the other covariates in the model do not seem to explain the difference in the association between IQ and AUD in the two groups.
In the present manuscript we don't have information as how the average and range of scores in intelligence in these two groups. Alternatively, could it be that the difference in odds ratios is simply due to the fact that the psychiatric group has systematically lower intelligence scores or a more restricted range of scores?
The intelligence score ranged from 53 to 137 points and the mean score was 94.3 (SD=15.2) in men with psychiatric disorders, while the score ranged from 59 to 144 points and the mean was 101.3 (SD=14.6) in men without psychiatric disorders. Levene's test for homogeneity of intelligence variances was insignificant (p=0.24) suggesting that this does not explain the difference in ORs for the two psychiatric groups.
Finally, in terms of the general interpretation of the study, some mention of assortative mating, as it relates to intelligence and psychiatric disorders is worthwhile, as these factors pose some limitations for the interpretation for the findings.
In our study, assortative mating could refer to the cohort members' parents. However, we did not find interaction between intelligence and parental psychiatric disorders. In principle it could also refer to the cohort members and their spouses, but in both cases we find that a discussion of assortative mating would be too speculative to include in the manuscript. Should the editor disagree, it can be included.
I have a few reactions to the response letter. My responses to the authors' letter are in bold. "Due to significant interaction between intelligence and other psychiatric disorders (p<0.001) with respect to risk of AUD in the multiple adjusted model, the full sample was stratified by psychiatric disorders ( Table 2) ." (Page 13)
The point here is that collinearity between predictors could be an explanation for the absence of effects or their presence. I would think that the only way to explore this would be to run the models both as restricted subsets which explore the presence of interactions and those which are based on a full model including all variables and terms.
To examine the influence of collinearity among predictors, Pearson's correlation coefficients were calculated between IQ and each of the confounding variables in the two psychiatric groups (for the binary variables the correlations are point-biserial correlations). Table 1 shows relatively low correlations for all confounding factors except for childhood SEP. Subsequently, we tested the interaction between intelligence and other psychiatric disorders with respect to risk of AUD in two models: an unadjusted model and a restricted model in which childhood SEP was eliminated because of its collinearity with IQ. In the unadjusted model, the p-value for the interaction was <0.0001. In the restricted model (adjusting for parental AUD, parental psychiatric disorders, maternal smoking, birth weight, maternal age and parity), the p-value was 0.0001. Based on these results, collinearity among IQ and childhood SEP does not seem to be a factor in explaining the interaction. Regarding the confounders, most of them were measured at birth, but due to their nature they could not change during childhood (e.g. birth weight, smoking during pregnancy). Nevertheless, it is correct that childhood socioeconomic position (SEP) was measured at one year after birth.
Assessment of SEP at this age has the advantage that it is unlikely to be influenced by characteristics of the child, but it also has the limitation that it may not be representative of family social status throughout childhood. This is now commented on in the discussion:
I only note that the confounds present in the data are not necessarily limited to the measures gathered at birth. Some description of types of confounders which were not assessed is appropriate, such as the differential access to education or the social environments which individuals encountered subsequent to the initial assessment.
The reviewer describes social factors encountered subsequent to the assessment of intelligence. In such cases, they could be considered mediators (for which we do not want to adjust) of the intelligence-AUD association. However, it is true that residual confounding may have influenced our results to some degree. Thus, we have now included this as a further limitation in the discussion section (and deleted the sentence about childhood SEP leading to residual confounding):
"Also, we cannot reject confounding by unmeasured factors; for instance, early adverse experiences and genetic factors, which influence both development of intelligence [39, 40] In Denmark conscientious objectors have to appear before the draft board, and thus draft board records include individuals who are objectors. Therefore, this should not bias the results.
p. 18 It is worth mentioning that AUD's vary as a function of lifespan and so the lifespan developmental aspect of the diagnosis bears mentioning, particularly as it relates to intelligence, which also varies across the lifespan.
We have now rewritten the limitation about AUD across the lifespan in relation to intelligence:
"Further, we did not consider trajectories of AUD across the lifespan in relation to intelligence scores, although recent studies indicate that AUD varies across the lifespan [37, 38] . Nevertheless, our sensitivity analyses of age of AUD onset indicated that intelligence may have a larger influence on early-onset AUD than late-onset." Figure 1 include percentages for the reader.
Author, revision 2: This is now provided.
Author, revision 2: We thank the reviewer for all the above comments. 
GENERAL COMMENTS
Review of bmjopen-2019-028997.R2, "Intelligence in young adulthood and alcohol use disorders in a prospective cohort study of Danish men: The role of psychiatric disorders and parental psychiatric history" I believe that the authors have conducted a responsive revision of the points raised in the earlier review. The only point I would like to raise, by way of explanation, concerns assortative mating, where the authors respond: "In our study, assortative mating could refer to the cohort members' parents. However, we did not find interaction between intelligence and parental psychiatric disorders. In principle it could also refer to the cohort members and their spouses, but in both cases we find that a discussion of assortative mating would be too speculative to include in the manuscript. Should the editor disagree, it can be included." To this I would only comment that assortative mating is very often the object of research in alcoholism and comorbidity with other problem behaviors. For example, in dealing with estimates of the heritability of alcoholism (https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/17378921) and other studies looking at the assortative mating effects for psychopathologies are also in the literature. Generally to my
